**IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER**

This free report is only intended to provide a graphical representation of the incidents already provided within the ANSO weekly narrative reports. Unless otherwise stated ANSO, and our donors, do not infer, support, propose or endorse any conclusions or assumptions as may be drawn from, or are implicit within, this data. Readers are reminded that all data is based solely on incidents which appear in the ANSO weekly report. Such incidents are compiled by ANSO on the basis of information received from multiple sources, including governmental, non-governmental, civilian, military, international and Afghan organizations and individuals, and thus should not be taken as a wholly accurate or complete representation of the level, nature, cause or trend of events.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the beginning of 2007 NGOs have been directly targeted or impacted in 70 separate crime and conflict-related incidents.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, the criminal events (which comprise 50 of the 70) have proved the more serious by accounting for all five of the NGO deaths that have occurred this year.

The motives behind these murders have varied from ideologically driven ‘hate crime’, as in Sar-i-Pul in March where a German worker was killed at the roadside simply for being “foreign”, through to more routine disputes over money or family affairs, as in Farayab in February where an Afghan employee was brutally murdered at his own front door by business partners.

Although none of these cases gave cause to believe that the NGO involved were being deliberately targeted for their actions, they all highlighted the environment within which NGOs are operating, especially in the North.

ANSO assesses that the impunity of local power-brokers will continue to combine with limited GoA law enforcement capacity to create an environment in which NGOs will continue to suffer criminally related fatalities going into 2008.

The destabilizing effects of insurgency, which is rapidly being introduced to the North, North-East and West, can only be expected to amplify this process by providing inspiration, protection and a conducive environment for armed crime.

Beyond crime, attacks and threats by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) towards NGOs, although not fatal so far, have been no less serious.

Along with the usual volume of threat-letters, the quarterly period has also seen an escalation in the amount of direct contact between the Taliban (and other AOG) and the NGO community, predominantly in the East.

Such contacts have usually taken the form of “intelligence screening” measures with AOG forcibly entering NGO compounds to look for links to the

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1 It is notable that 4 of the 5 murders occurred in the North and North East regions.
2 Predominantly former combatants, but also religious and ethnic leaders
Government, ISAF and the PRT (3 of 5) although frightening armed assaults have also taken place in what have been assessed to be failed kidnap attempts or just plain intimidations.

Although certainly disturbing the fact that no deaths have resulted from these attacks, despite ample opportunity, could provide an encouraging indicator of ‘discrimination’ on behalf of the AOG involved.

ANSO assesses that direct contact between NGO and Taliban is likely to increase going in to 2008 and that a demonstrable independence from military and political efforts will be the key factor in determining whether such contact turns fatal or not.

Beyond impact on NGO, ANSO has continued to track conventional and asymmetric conflict across the country.

ANSO figures demonstrate a significant monthly escalation in conflict through the first two quarters from 139 attacks in the month of January up to 341 for the month June.

An annual comparison is also telling and indicates that 2007 has overtaken 2006 in pace and volume of attacks with June alone showing close to a 100% increase over last year.

Major escalation has been noted across the entire South and East while new, smaller, fronts have opened up in the North (Kunduz), West (Farah & Badghis) and Central (Wardak & Kapisa) demonstrating AOG capacity and intent to conduct activities across the country.

ANSO assesses the increase to be caused by both a genuine improvement in AOG capacity and manpower but also because International Military Forces (IMF) have been on the offensive and thus presenting more targets to AOG.

Along with conventional attack tactics this period has also seen larger well coordinated attacks against district centers or bases with Government forces frequently routed or overwhelmed.

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3 AOG Indirect, Close Range and Suicide Attacks June 2006: 190 / AOG Indirect, Close Range and Suicide Attacks June 2007: 341
ANSO has tracked with some concern the introduction of new technologies and tactics, such as the use of secondary IED or powerful ‘projectile’ devices, the increased lethality of suicide strikes\textsuperscript{4} and a notable trend of attacks on aircraft.

It is ANSO assessment that the pace and nature of the insurgency will continue along these lines for the remainder of the year with a ‘peak volume’ of conventional attacks occurring in mid to late October.

ANSO assesses that there is a high probability of a ‘signature atrocity’ (possibly involving use of multiple/combined suicide/IED attacks) within the remainder of 2007 and expects to see more coordinated attacks against district centers in the East and South as AOG move to disrupt GoA command capability along main supply routes.

This free report is provided to assist in NGO strategy for the remainder of 2007 and is available for use in reports, proposals and planning documents without consent.

Sincerely,

Nic Lee
ANSO Director
July 18\textsuperscript{th}, Kabul

\textsuperscript{4} The first 36 attacks of the year killed 34 civilians while the next 35 attacks killed 68 civilians.
SECTION 1: Impact on NGO

1. NGO Direct Incidents: It demonstrates that the gross volume of incidents NGO\(^5\) are directly involved in each month remains stable. This is a good general indicator that NGO are not broadly targeted by AOG but these gross figures hide important differences between areas and types of incident.

![Bar chart showing NGO direct incidents from January to June]

2. Cause of Direct Incidents: The picture becomes clearer by disaggregating crime from conflict. This table demonstrates a clear upward pattern in crime related events but this should be linked to increased seasonal exposure. It also confirms that NGO are more likely to be victims of crime than conflict.

![Line chart showing crime and conflict from January to June]

\(^5\) The absence of any data of the population of NGO each month makes these figures only of general use.
3. Quarterly NGO Trends: When looked at on a quarterly basis however, the data indicates a slight upward trend in both criminal and conflict acts affecting NGO. Incidents caused by AOG show a 50% increase (from 8-12) between the two periods. On further analysis we can attribute this entirely to the East.

4. AOG incidents on NGO by region and quarter: Disaggregating the AOG incidents in table 3 above by geographic region demonstrates that the quarterly upward trend (from 8-12) is entirely driven by the dramatic expansion of AOG on NGO incidents in the East. Other areas have remained constant while the East has seen a six-fold increase in volume of AOG on NGO incidents between the two quarters. We can expect this trend to continue for the rest of 2007.
5. Gross Distribution of NGO Incidents: These tables demonstrate gross incidents (AOG & Crime) since Jan 1st 2007 impacting NGO by region and province for your records and reference only.
6. AOG against NGO Incident Types: Where NGO and Armed Opposition Groups have interacted it has largely (35%) been in the form of intimidation such as receiving a threatening letter or phone call. Beyond threats however AOG have resorted to outright assaults with small arms fire (SAF) and RPG on five occasions (25%), where staff have been beaten and injured and assets destroyed, the use of IED twice (10%), assessed as intimidation attempts and arson once (5%). It has been notable however that no deaths have been caused in such assaults, despite ample opportunity to do so. While some of this has certainly been down to dumb luck, such as an RPG failing to detonate as it bounces off an occupied vehicle, ANSO believes it also indicates a lack of intent to do harm to ‘genuine’ and impartial humanitarian agencies. Finally, NGO staff have found themselves kidnapped by AOG on 5 separate occasions this year (25%) with more than nine people (2 international) involved in these incidents, all thankfully released unharmed after review.

Chronology of Significant NGO AOG attacks:

- Jan 13th, Paktika: An NGO clinic was burnt in an effort to intimidate students;
- Jan 10th & 13th, Takhar: A series of IED detonates in front of a HR-NGO office;
- Feb 19th, Paktya: Three staff of de-mining NGO are abducted;
- April 3rd, Nimroz: Taliban kidnap five French NGO staff including two French;
- April 16th, Laghman: Taliban assault an NGO compound in a failed kidnap effort;
- May 29th, Nuristan: AOG enter NGO office to beat and interview staff;
- June 29th, Nangahar: AOG attack and enter an NGO clinic in an assumed act of intimidation.
7. Crime against NGO Incident Types: NGO have continued to be exceptionally vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including comparative wealth, travel in remote areas, predictability of operations and demographics. Primarily NGO have been victimized by armed robberies (66%) many of which, especially on the road, have been violent and disturbing for those involved. Beyond this however, NGO staff (as importantly distinguished from their agencies) have also been involved in a number of fatal shootings (16%) in which five persons have lost their lives including one international. The motive in each case is different (from ideology to economics) but these events demonstrate the vulnerability of unarmed NGO in a criminally conducive environment. Abductions for ransom or personal revenge have occurred on four occasions (9%) and accounted for 10 persons all, again thankfully, released without harm after payment. Finally, NGO have been the victim of intimidation by communities or special interest groups on four occasions (9%) where drivers have been beaten by unknown men or NGO vehicles have been stoned by local villagers.

Chronology of Significant NGO Crimes:

- Jan 30th, Laghman: 15 armed robbers assault NGO compound and steal assets;
- Feb 17th, Farayab: NGO employee killed at home in assumed personal dispute;
- March 8th, Sar-i-Pul: German NGO worker murdered by Mullah’s gunmen;
- April 29th, Kunduz: NGO employee murdered on road in contract dispute;
- May 21st, Kabul: Local boy fires shots and throw grenade at NGO expat staff;
- June 13th & 20th, Nangahar/Nuristan: 8 NGO workers kidnapped for ransom.
SECTION 2: The Conflict

1. **Total Attack Trends:** After an inconclusive first quarter in which ANSO reported “no significant changes” the gross volume of AOG attacks (which includes all indirect, close range and suicide attacks) undertakes a sustained three months growth period more than doubling in size since the beginning of the year. This can be associated with IMF offensive operations as well as improved AOG capacity.

![Graph showing the total attack trends from January to June.](image)

2. **Annual Comparison of Attacks:** Further than the significant monthly escalation, this brief table demonstrates that the volume of AOG attacks has also increased over the same period last year.

![Bar chart comparing the number of attacks in 2006 and 2007.](image)

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6 Full annual comparison (month by month) is in process and will be available for next Q report period.
3. Tactical Expansion: Further disaggregating the gross AOG attacks into the two main tactical types, ANSO records confirm significant escalation. What is interesting about this data is the consistency with which each tactic escalates. Further analysis (below) confirms that even though the gross volume of attacks has doubled the proportion of each attack type to the whole remains quite constant (e.g. roadside IED are consistently around 25% of all attacks). This is important as it implies that, far from being ad-hoc actions of disorganized terrorists, conflict activities are consciously ‘scaled-up’ maintaining the structural integrity of each combat group towards one another so as not to result in an unbalanced attack profile.

Profile at end of June (341 total)
Profile at end of May (325 total)
Profile at end of April (245 total)
Profile at end of March (158 total)

7 **Indirect** includes all IED, mines, mortars and rockets; **Close Range** includes all small arms, RPG, grenade, arson, beheading and hanging.
4. Use of Indirect Devices: AOG close range attacks are uniquely targeted towards IMF and GoA targets to the extent that they are not a concern to NGO. However, indirect, and by nature more indiscriminate, tactics such as roadside IED and poorly guided rockets pose a very credible threat to NGO staff.

These tables demonstrate escalation in the use of both rockets and roadside IED over the period and ANSO assess that these trends will continue in parallel with the expansion of the overall attacks.

It is notable that at the first quarterly report we reported an ‘impressive’ IED recovery rate of 2-1, however this rate has dropped over time and today fewer devices are recovered than detonate.

The failure rate (premature detonation) of IED is low at around 9%.
5. Suicide Attack Trends: There have been a total of 71 suicide attacks up to the end of June (July has seen an additional 9 at the time of writing), demonstrating an unpredictable trend of rise and fall. Although the Taliban have made much propaganda around the volume of ‘suicide volunteers’ in reality with 6 months of the year gone the attack rate will need to escalate sharply if it is even to match last years total let alone surpass it.

6. Increased Lethality of Suicide Attacks: Although the volume of suicide attacks is steady, the following three tables demonstrate that the average number of deaths caused by each attack increased dramatically within the second quarter. This can be associated to a number of factors including an increased explosive yield per device, premature detonations (standing in lines) and deliberately indiscriminate target selection to maximize public fear.

Figure 1: Civilians killed in suicide attacks: On an average weighting the number of civilians killed by a suicide attack has come close to doubling from 1.17 for Q.1 up to 1.84 for Q.II. The total average for 2007 is 1.5 people per device
Figure 2: Total number of IMF and ANP/ANA killed per suicide device. On average weighting the number of ANA/ANP killed per device has risen from 0.3 for Q.I to 1.4 for Q.II. The total average for 2007 is 1 ANA or 1 ANP person per device.

Figure 3: Demonstrates civilian casualty trends compared to suicide attacks on a monthly basis to demonstrate that while attacks decrease (Mar-Jun) casualties actually increase.

Chronology of Significant Suicide Attacks:
January 23rd, Khost: BBIED at East gate of Khost Airport kills 6 day-laborers;
Feb 27th, Parwan: BBIED at Baghram kills 16 civilians and 3 ISAF troops;
Mar 19th, Kabul: VBIED rams PSC convoy killing one expatriate;
April 16th, Kunduz: BBIED enters ANP compound kills 9 injures 24
June 15th, Uruzgan: VBIED targets ISAF convoy killing 8 civilians and 1 ISAF
June 17th, Kabul: BBIED boards NP bus killing 22 ANP and injuring 35 more;
7. Suicide Attack Locations: Demonstrates the location and volume of suicide attacks (disaggregated BBIED/VBIED) to end of June for your reference and records. Chart scales match to allow visual comparison.
8. AOG Regional Attacks Trends: Final graph in this section demonstrates the monthly changes in AOG attacks per ISAF command region. As already noted the data supports an assessment of significant escalation of attacks in South and East regions with more sporadic growth in West, North and Central. Please note differing chart scales when making visual comparisons.
SECTION 3: Casualties and Damages

With such an escalation in violence it is perhaps unsurprising that the number of fatalities and injuries, in all sectors of the society has climbed this quarter. Thankfully the direct impact on NGO staff has remained limited, at least in contrast to previous years, but this good news has been more than offset by significant and, often, avoidable casualties amongst Afghan civilians.

This section provides a detailed breakdown of the figures ANSO has collated since the beginning of the year. Please note that while due diligence measures are taken in verifying figures (such as contact with local hospitals, media, NGO and inhabitants) there will undoubtedly be some margin of error. Unless otherwise stated as accurate then, figures are presented as indicative of general trends and patterns only.

1. NGO Fatalities: Demonstrates accurate national and international NGO deaths since 2003 (one additional national death occurred in July at time of writing). Data indicates that NGO fatalities are low relative to previous years the causes of which are unknown. Speculative reasons could include lower volume of NGO operating in country or more caution in operating. It is certainly not due to less conflict as this report has demonstrated.
2. Humanitarian and International Community Fatalities: Beyond NGO fatalities, a further eight international community expatriates (mostly working as security guards for civilian agencies) have been killed and an additional two national employees from within the Humanitarian community.

3. Afghan Security Forces Fatalities & Injuries: This quarter has maintained the trend of ANP sustaining the greater proportion of casualties. Issues such as mandate, training, equipment and access to emergency medical support are behind this dynamic. AOG have deliberately targeted ANP due to their role in ‘extending’ Government presence in to districts and have successfully routed them from a number of areas.

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8 Broadly the UN family and Red Cross organizations
4. Gross Civilian Deaths: ANSO has recorded 678 conflict related civilian deaths\(^9\) between Jan 1\(^{st}\) and June 30\(^{th}\) 2007 with an additional 226 deaths attributed to acts of crime during the same period. It is notable that during the last quarter the IMF portion of these deaths amounted to just 21% of the total and AOG 41%, by this quarter they have drawn near level (37%/38% respectively).

ANSO assesses that there will be little change in the volume of civilian casualties so long as the dynamics of the conflict remain the same with AOG attacking from within civilian populations and IMF responding with air forces. Both sides have made palliative statements with regards to the efforts they are taking to avoid such, but these claims would not appear to be supported by the data.

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\(^9\) Defined as those deaths resulting from attacks and activities of AOG and IMF only. Does not include deaths due to accidents, natural disaster or crime.
5. **Gross Civilian Casualty Trends**: Clearly demonstrates the impact of escalating conflict and crime of the civilian community with an almost 400% increase in civilian deaths between January and June 2007. July so far figures look set to continue the trend.

![Graph showing civilian deaths by month from January to June 2007.](image)

6. **Leading Causes of Civilian Death**: This data indicates that conventional combat activity causes most deaths although significant numbers are being killed in AOG suicide attacks and IMF force protection measures\(^{10}\). Criminal murder (which includes tribal clashes as well as domestic events) remains the third leading causes of civilian death and yet is rarely discussed in policy circles with the same level of urgency.

![Bar chart showing the leading causes of civilian death.](image)

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\(^{10}\) Shooting at a person or vehicle for coming too close to a convoy or patrol on suspicion of them being a suicide bomber
**REPORT ENDS**

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